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SPECIAL FEATURE
The study of metaphor as part of critical discourse analysis
Andreas Musolff∗
School of Language and Communication Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
This article discusses how the study of metaphoric and more generally, figurative language
use contributes to critical discourse analysis (CDA). It shows how cognitive linguists’
recognition of metaphor as a fundamental means of concept- and argument-building can
add to CDA’s account of meaning constitution in the social context. It then discusses
discrepancies between the early model of conceptual metaphor theory and empirical data
and argues that discursive-pragmatic factors as well as sociolinguistic variation have to be
taken into account in order to make cognitive analyses more empirically and socially
relevant. In conclusion, we sketch a modified cognitive approach informed by Relevance
Theory within CDA.
Keywords: discourse; metaphor; cognitive linguistics; conceptual metaphor analysis; critical
discourse analysis; racism
Introduction: how can metaphor analysis help to unmask racist ideology in discourse?
In 2008, Dominic Lu¨thard, leader of the far right-wing ‘Party of nationally oriented Swiss’
attacked the then newly elected ‘Miss Switzerland’, Whitney Toyloy, and her runner-up,
Rekha Datta, as personifying the ‘brown tumour that was eating up’ free Switzerland (Die
Welt-Online, 15 October 2008) on account of their dark skin colour. Whilst a local judge initially
imposed a fine of 500 Swiss Franks on Lu¨thard, the district court acquitted him a few months
later because his attack against Toyloy and Datta did not in their view constitute ‘racial discrimi-
nation’ (Tages-Anzeiger, 3 April 2009). The verdict was celebrated by Lu¨thard and his party as a
‘victory for free speech’ but from a ‘critical linguistics’ viewpoint clearly demonstrates an uncri-
tical understanding of the use of metaphors in public discourse: they were considered to be just
‘colourful’ rhetorical ornaments that may be emotionally loaded and perhaps even ethically
reprehensible but have no bearing on the core information of a statement and its implications,
for which the speaker can be held legally responsible. In 2011, Lu¨thard used the same trick to
denounce the new ‘Miss Switzerland’, Alina Buschschacher, on account of her Caribbean
family background, as being part to the ‘multicultural decomposition’ of Switzerland. Again,
as in 2009, commentators doubted that he could be successfully persecuted for his racist
remarks because he avoided making ‘factually incorrect’ statements and only used ‘subjective’
imagery (Blick, 28 September 2011).
The investigation and exposure of racist metaphor have always been part of the critically
oriented approach to language study, whether in the sense of early critical linguistics that
built its research agenda on the ‘Critical Theory’ of the Frankfurt School or the more recent
strands of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the closely related discourse-historical
Approach (Fairclough, 1995; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Wodak, 2009; Wodak & Chilton,
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2005). The propensity of racists to dehumanize their victims both verbally and practically has in
fact generated a whole research tradition in its own right, which has highlighted a systematic
conceptual framework of the ‘Great Chain of Being’ (Lovejoy, 1936) that allows racists to deni-
grate their respective targets by ‘demoting’ them from humankind’s central position in the Chain
down to the ‘lower’ ranks of animals, plants, disease-engendering organisms or inorganic
material (Bosmajian, 1983; Chilton, 2005; Hawkins, 2001; Musolff, 2010; Rash, 2006; Richard-
son & Wodak, 2009; Sontag, 1978).
In order to be able to evaluate the explanatory power of cognitive metaphor analysis, we need
to first compare it briefly with traditional theories, then discuss its claims to provide an innova-
tive and wider-reaching account of metaphor in discourse, and assess its capability of dealing
with empirical data. In conclusion, we argue that cognitive metaphor analysis needs to be com-
plemented by a pragmatic, specifically relevance-oriented approach to be fruitful for CDA.
Metaphor, rhetoric and cognition
Critical interest in metaphor investigation has not been confined to its use in hate speech and stig-
matizing discourse: due to its prominence in public texts and discourses of all kinds, metaphor has
been recognized as one of themost important rhetorical devices ever sinceAristotle (1991) treated
it in his Art of rhetoric.1 From antiquity onwards through the twentieth century, metaphorical
speech has been at the centre of rhetorical training and was regarded as a socially powerful but
also dangerous ‘trope’ or figure of speech that required special attention and critique (Johnson,
1981; Stutterheim, 1941, pp. 60–162). Insofar as this rhetorical tradition became fossilized in edu-
cational contexts as well as in its references to Aristotelian or other ‘classical’ definitions, it
became the object of critique and dismissive treatment in modern semantics and analytical phil-
osophy, to the point where a New rhetoric or Philosophy of rhetoric attempted to put it on new
theoretical foundations by linking it with phenomenologically oriented new theories of analogy
and practical, i.e. non-formal argumentation (Black, 1962; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969; Richards, 1936; Ricoeur, 1975;Weinrich, 1967). In mainstream semantics and pragmatics,
however, metaphor and other figurative uses of speech were still treated as ‘indirect’ or derivative
meaning aspects which required special lexical rules (Leech, 1981, pp. 214–219; Lyons, 1977,
pp. 103–104) or several steps to recover the sense of an utterance from a seeming violation of
a lexical convention or a conversational maxim (Grice, 1989, p. 34; for a detailed critique see Lee-
zenberg, 2001, pp. 69–124; Searle, 1993, pp. 102–111).
Against the trend of classifying metaphor and figurative speech as a semantically and/or
pragmatically ‘extraordinary’ phenomenon, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published their
famous, programmatically entitled book Metaphors we live by in 1980, which became the foun-
dation text for a new, ‘cognitively’ oriented theory of meaning. Metaphor was no longer seen as
ephemeral to a theory of meaning but as being ‘among our principal vehicles for understanding’
our physical, social and inner world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 159) by ‘mapping’ conceptual
structures from a relatively familiar, experientially grounded ‘source domain’ onto a more
abstract or less well-known ‘target domain’ (Lakoff, 1993, pp. 208–209; Lakoff & Johnson,
1980, pp. 156–160). Far from merely adding rhetorical flourish to pieces of information, meta-
phors are viewed as being ‘conceptual in nature’ and essential for the creation of social realities:
‘A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action. Such actions will, of course, fit the metaphor.
This will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense
metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 156). It is evident that
such a perspective on metaphor as a conceptually significant, even central, cognitive mechanism
matches the research interests of CDA to a large extent. As a consequence, a continuous stream
of cognitively orientated CDA analyses of metaphor has been published over the past decades,
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which includes several analyses of US political discourse by Lakoff himself (Lakoff, 1992,
1996, 2003, 2004) and shows little sign of abatement.2
In order to get a sense of the explanatory potential and limits of this early cognitive approach
to political metaphor analysis called ‘Conceptual Metaphor Theory’ (abbreviated as CMT), let
us consider the following examples, all taken from a research corpus of current-day public
discourse in Britain containing body- and illness-related source concepts:3
(1) So long as there has been a body politic to host them, parasites have feasted on its blood.
(The Independent, 7 December 2011; from an article about lobbyists’ alleged influence
on British government policy; italics here and in other examples supplied by the author
to indicate relevant metaphorical expressions).
(2) Paul Kagame, the only leader Rwanda has known since the end of the genocide, has said
his country is not ready for the ‘medicine’ of democracy ahead of elections in August.
(The Independent, 25 June 2010).
(3) Killing off the cancerous spread of the BNP [¼ right-wing extremist ‘British National
Party’] is within our grasp (quotation from a statement by the then Labour Party minister,
John Denham, in The Daily Telegraph, 25 June 2010).
On the basis of these examples and on Lu¨thard’s racist attacks cited above, we can posit a
conceptual metaphor A NATION STATE IS A HUMAN BODY, which has the following
implications (in CMT, the latter are called ‘entailments’):
. a nation state can be healthy or fall ill;
. when it is ill, it suffers from specific diseases (e.g. ‘cancer’, ‘tumour’) and needs therapy
(e.g. ‘medicine of democracy’);
. the illness may be the effect of disease-carrying and -spreading agents, e.g. ‘parasites’ that
live off the state’s body (‘feast on its blood’) until it is destroyed and ‘decomposes’.
What is relevant in this analysis from a CDA viewpoint is the argumentative advantage that
the metaphor gives its users when they want to (dis-)qualify political developments, social
groups or even individuals as threatening the identity or continued existence of a nation state.
Instead of laboriously having to demonstrate and back up their claims with facts, which could
be critically tested and challenged, the speaker/writer invites the hearer/reader to access knowl-
edge about the undesirability of illness and the necessity for therapy by referring to generally
known illnesses and agents of disease. The respective conceptual items (cancer, parasites,
decomposition) also carry social, emotional and aesthetic values that influence the interpretation
of the utterance. This conceptual complex forms a ‘source domain’ from which, by way of
analogy, both its elements and their relations are mapped on the ‘target domain’ of political enti-
ties. The hearer/reader can thus work out the implications in a seemingly straightforward way:
just as it is imperative for a successful medical therapy to eliminate all agents of disease in case
of a serious illness, so any socio-political elements of the nation that threaten its existence have
to be eliminated. If these inferences were acknowledged as valid conclusions in a legal system,
the judicial prosecution of racists such as Lu¨thard would obviously be much more plausible than
under the still prevailing assumption that metaphors have no logical and therefore no practical
consequences that could be taken seriously. However, the dominant nonchalant attitude to the
meaning value of metaphors allows speakers to express and insinuate even the most extreme
views under the guise of ‘subjectively’ coloured figurative speech. This opportunity is of
course not restricted to racist extremism – even though it has had some of its greatest and
most devastating impact in that field (as the historical record shows) – but it pertains to all
fields of public, especially political discourse. Being a competent political speaker/writer
implies the expert use of metaphors to promote potentially problematic political concepts
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without incurring the risk of being held legally or socially responsible. It is obvious that the
application of CMT to political discourse, or as Charteris-Black has felicitously dubbed it,
CMA (Critical Metaphor Analysis), can provide “particular insight into why the rhetoric of pol-
itical leaders is successful” (Charteris-Black 2005, p. 197). We shall return to this general point
of the social impact of metaphor in the last section.
So far we have assumed a straightforward relationship between source and target domains, in
the sense that the mapped conceptual relations and implications appear to be congruent. For
more complex, incongruent cases, Lakoff (1993, p. 215) formulated a so-called ‘invariance prin-
ciple’ which stipulated that metaphorical mappings ‘preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the
image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the target domain’. At
first sight, this principle seems to reflect only the reasonable assumption that any source image
schema is preserved only as long as it does not impede the understanding of the target meaning;
however, some empirically observed examples of metaphorical discourse indicate that the
relationship is more complex. Consider, for instance, the following quotations, which have
also been taken from the body-related metaphor corpus:
(4) The Tory leader’s ambition, on current evidence, is to make Britain the ingrowing
toenail of Europe (The Daily Telegraph, 26 October 2009).
(5) [Boris Johnson (Conservative British politician, Mayor of London)] said, ‘as a mere
Mayor of London, as a mere toenail in the body politic, it may be difficult to have a
referendum [on the EU Lisbon Treaty]’ (BBC Newsnight, 5 October 2009).
(6) There is a large part of me that does not want to read another sentence about this lately
exploded pustule on the posterior of the British body politic [intended referent: Damian
McBride, adviser to Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown] (The Daily Telegraph, 13
April 2009, author: Boris Johnson).
Images of a toenail or pustule on the body politic are grotesque applications of body source con-
cepts in political discourse, which serve polemical purposes (see examples 4 and 6) or achieve an
ironic effect (example 5), where Johnson’s seeming self-deprecation (‘mere toenail’) is contra-
dicted by the juxtaposed self-qualification as a Mayor of London (which is, of course, a highly
influential and prominent political position in the UK). For anyone with sufficient background
knowledge about British politics in 2009, these metaphors were all perfectly transparent, i.e.
they fit with the ‘cognitive topology of the target domain’ in Lakoff’s sense. Viewed from the
source domain, however, they are rather problematic. If Britain were to become an ingrowing
toenail of Europe, as pictured in (4), it would certainly be uncomfortable for the rest of the
(implied) body of the European Union (metonymically referred to as ‘Europe’) but of course
in the first place also for itself. How could anyone, let alone a patriotic conservative politician,
make it their ambition to achieve such a status for their own nation? In (5), Boris Johnson refers
to himself as a lowly toenail in the British body politic, which leaves the remaining source
domain underdetermined: if he is the toenail, who or what is supposed to be the toe? Further-
more, the overall meaning is evidently to be understood ironically, i.e. implicitly negated. So,
if he is not the toenail of the British nation, what is he then? Johnson’s earlier disqualification
of an adversary as a pustule on the body politic in (6) is transparent enough as a crass insult but
the assertion that the pustule has ‘lately exploded’ would seem, at source level, to mean that this
bodily affliction is near its end, because the underlying infection will normally subside.
However, Johnson was in fact referring to an alleged smear-campaign by the Labour adviser
against the Tories, which had just ‘exploded’ onto the British media world. The seemingly
coherent image of the exploding pustule is arguably more of a clever word-play than an analo-
gically stringent mapping of congruent domain aspects.
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Such incongruence between source and target domains can be dealt with by CMT as mani-
festations of the ‘invariance principle’, insofar as source domain aspects that are irrelevant for
the target domain are cancelled out. However, the question then arises how a hearer/reader pro-
ceeds to work out which implications to allow and which ones not. Clearly, any successful
understanding of the respective metaphors in the above cited examples depends largely on the
hearer/reader’s knowledge of topical British politics – but that knowledge is not, strictly speak-
ing, the target domain. The latter is, rather, the field of politics in general, not a particular pol-
itical configuration or situation. In other contexts, it might be conceivable to speak of X as an
ingrowing toenail that is being operated upon or removed or X as a toe being superior to Y
as the toenail or of X as an exploding pustule giving relief to the whole body, i.e. with wholly
different implications. Thus, we can see that the source domain’s ‘cognitive topology’ is open
for many other mappings and can hardly act as a constraint for the choice of target domain
elements or relations as input into the metaphor, as demanded by the invariance principle. In
short, it is not so much the knowledge domains but the immediate and wider context that ‘con-
strains’ the sense in which a metaphorical utterance is understood. Depending on the contexts of
use, the source domain content can vary almost infinitely, and such variation has indeed been
observed and described in numerous empirical metaphor studies (Charteris-Black, 2004, 2005;
Ko¨vecses, 2009; Musolff, 2004, 2010; Semino, 2008; Steen, 2007), and it even increases when
cross-linguistic and -cultural data are considered (Ko¨vecses, 2005, 2006; Yu, 2008a, 2008b). On
the other hand, one fundamental tenet of CMT, as well as of its further development in ‘Conceptual
Integration theory’ has been the insistence on the creative power of metaphor, i.e. its capacity to
make accessible new, unfamiliar or only vaguely known target domain elements and counterfactual
scenarios (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 147–155). However, this
creates a further dilemma for any strict application of the invariance principle: if the target
domain’s cognitive topology is still to some extent unknown, how can it possibly constrain the
source input into mappings? The cognitive ‘constraining’ power of source and target domains
thus cannot be regarded as pre-established; otherwise, the ‘invariance principle’ becomes circular.
Rather than ‘underlying’ discourse, the mapping process is the product of discourse.
The discursive significance of metaphor
In view of these and other difficulties of CMT in dealing with empirical discourse data, several
new cognitively oriented approaches have emerged that aim to preserve and develop further
the groundbreaking insights into the conceptual significance (and with it, the social accountabil-
ity) of metaphor without denying or ‘arguing away’ variation phenomena and the problems of
assuming pre-discursively established source–target mappings. Such approaches have focussed
on the complex relationship between metaphor and metonymy insofar as the latter seems to
provide much of the ‘emergent’ conceptual material for the former in real life discourse (Barce-
lona, 2000; Dirven & Po¨rings, 2003; Panther & Radden, 1999; Radden, 2000), the nature of argu-
ment-relations in figurative speech (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008), the ‘deliberateness’ of salient
metaphor uses in public and literary discourses that compel the hearer/reader to attend to the other-
ness of source concepts by way of a comparison (Steen, 2008, 2011), and the dialogic function of
metaphor in actual and scripted conversation (Cameron, 2007, 2011; Musolff, 2011). Some of
these approaches have been developed independent of CDA but are by no means incompatible
with it. Nor are they incompatible with the cognitive approach; in fact they can be seen as trans-
cending the latter’s tendency to focus on conceptual and categorical structures by accounting for
argumentative, inferential and interactional dimensions of metaphor and metonymy. In doing so,
they presuppose – tacitly or explicitly – a wider theory of communication that would serve as a
framework in which to formulate sub-theories for specific types of metaphor uses.
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This general question of an integration of cognitive and communicative aspects in metaphor
theory has recently become the subject of intensive theoretical and methodological discussions
which focus on the relationship between CMT and specifically Relevance-theoretically (RT)
oriented analyses (Carston & Wearing, 2011; Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006, 2011; Sperber &
Wilson, 1995, 2008; Tendahl, 2009; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Wilson, 2011; Wilson &
Carston, 2006). This discussion can serve as a platform to sketch future perspectives in which
metaphor research can contribute to CDA. The most obvious overlap between CMT and RT
approaches to metaphor is that neither of them assumes ‘that metaphors must be analyzed lit-
erally before they can be interpreted metaphorically’ (Gibbs & Tendahl, 2006, p. 380).
However, whilst ‘classical’ CMT derives this conclusion from a conviction that ‘most of our
conceptual system is metaphorically structured’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 56), i.e. on the
assumption that a sophisticated metaphor theory is needed to explain cognition in a general
sense, Relevance Theory aims to give a ‘deflationary account of metaphor’ (Sperber &
Wilson, 2008) by grouping it in a range of ‘loose uses’ of language, which covers many of
the rhetorical tropes, all of which are explained in similar ways by the principles of ‘cognitive’
and ‘communicative relevance’ that underlie all ostensive communication (Sperber & Wilson,
1995, pp. 231–237; 2008, p. 84). A first, generally applicable RT explanation of metaphorical
understanding focuses on the category of ‘ad hoc’ concepts that ‘are adjusted to the precise cir-
cumstances of their use and are therefore unlikely to be paraphrasable by an ordinary language
expression’ (Sperber & Wilson, 2008, p. 102).
Instead of analysing, for instance, the rejection of unwanted physical contact, in the utter-
ance, ‘Keep your paws off me!’ as a cognitive ‘mapping’ operation across animal and human
extremities, Sperber and Wilson (2008, p. 102) interpret it as the ad hoc construction of a
concept ‘PAW∗’ (= the lexically recorded concept ‘PAW’) as ‘the most easily constructed
concept whose extension includes the hearer’s hands, and which carries the weak contextual
implications generally true of prototypical paws: that they are used clumsily, grossly and so
on’. This pragmatic explanation has the advantage of being economical and at the same time
psychologically plausible: such cases of transparent metaphor use in conversation and public
discourse require neither a huge conceptual architecture nor, as in older pragmatic explanations,
a deductive procedure to work out that a primary literal meaning is not accessible and therefore a
special figurative meaning should be sought.
On the other hand, ‘loose uses’ can only lead to ‘loose interpretations’ – this point is theor-
etically covered in RT by the assumption of only ‘weak contextual implications’; however, such
an analysis is not sufficient for the often strongly suggestive and communicative force of polem-
ical and argumentative language use that CDA is interested in. However, RT also allows for
strongly ‘implicated’, intended inferences, e.g. in dialogic uses (Sperber & Wilson, 2008, pp.
98–99) and for a second type of metaphor understanding (typically, extended or literary meta-
phors), ‘in which the literal meaning of metaphorically used language is maintained, framed or
metarepresented, and subjected to slower, more reflective interpretive inferences’ (Carston &
Wearing, 2011, p. 310, see also Carston, 2010, pp. 304–310). The following quotation may
provide a fitting example of political body imagery, for which this second type of metaphor
understanding is needed:
(7) The German question never dies. Instead, like a flu virus, it mutates. On the eve of unifica-
tion, some European leaders worried that it would resume killer form. ‘We’ve beaten the
Germans twice and now they’re back’, said Margaret Thatcher, Britain’s prime minister.
Such fears now look comical. But even today’s mild strain causes aches and pains, which
afflict different regions in different ways. America’s symptoms are mild. Central Europe
seems to have acquired immunity. After unification 85%of Poles looked uponGermany as
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a threat [. . .]. Now just a fifth do. It is among Germany’s long-standing west and south
European partners that the German question feels debilitating, and where a dangerous
flare-up still seems a possibility. Germany’s answer to the question matters not only to
them. It will shape Europe, and therefore the world (The Economist, 21 October 2010).
This passage is replete with lexical items evoking body imagery with regard to a supra-national
target referent. Within the body politic of the world, Germany is depicted as a potential disease-
carrier, a virus, that causes all kinds of symptoms and further physical reactions but that also has
the chance to ‘answer’ its own ‘question’. It would be implausible to interpret this text, in classic
CMT-style, as a non-deliberate, ‘automatic’ use of conceptual elements from one source
domain, or just as their fanciful ‘extension’, or as a series of five successive ad hoc concept con-
structions, as in RT’s ‘loose uses’ perspective. Instead, the metaphor is used to put forward and
develop a specific argument in which the various possibilities of the literal source meanings are
explicitly referred to in order to discuss the complexities of Germany’s relation with other
nations. The literal meanings of the respective medical/virological concepts should be viewed
as ‘lingering’ (Carston, 2010, p. 305) in the text and its interpretation, in order to sustain the
readers’ attention and understanding of the complex argument right up to the last part of the
‘agentivizing’ of Germany (into a self-conscious subject whose ‘answer to its own question’
is still to come), which evidently transcends any coherent bodily/medical source domain, i.e.
we would not speak in a coherent, source domain-determined biological/virological sense of a
virus that consciously considers its ‘answers’ to the ‘question’ it puts to the host body. Evidently,
this latter utterance content has got nothing to do with the source domain but equally evidently it
represents the crucial ‘point’ the writer tries to reach as the conclusion of her metaphorically
grounded argument. To argue that she did not intend the relevant inferences and cannot be
held responsible for them would be patently absurd.
This reasoning should also hold in other cases where a metaphoric statement is similarly
explicit, if not that extended, in its argumentative conclusiveness, e.g. the racist statements
quoted earlier. In fact, metaphor users have sometimes been held responsible for the implicatures
of their discourse – albeit usually from a safe geo-political or historical distance. Thus, the
Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s, repeated denunciations of Israel as a ‘tumour’
that needed to be ‘eliminated’ were criticized by Western governments and cited among the
reasons to isolate the Iranian regime internationally (The Times, 9 December 2005; Die
Su¨ddeutsche, 25 August 2011, Die Welt 26 August 2011). With the benefit of historical hind-
sight, the extreme dehumanization of Jews by the Nazis as well as of other victim groups of gen-
ocidal racism, which was dismissed as mere ‘wild rhetoric’ by contemporaries, has also been
exposed as providing the crucial framework in which the ensuing murderous policies could
be pseudo-legitimized (Bosmajian, 1983; Hawkins, 2001; Musolff, 2007; Rash, 2006). We
can therefore conclude that a ‘critically’ oriented, cognitive metaphor analysis has at least a
potential impact in communication ethics if and when it takes its own methodological and theor-
etical premises seriously, i.e. when it transcends mere commenting of ‘rhetorical’ aspects of pol-
itical and public discourse and instead engages instead with its cognitive import by way of
providing a pragmatically and psychologically plausible analysis of intended utterance
meaning that speakers can be held accountable for.
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Notes
1. Aristotle 1991, especially Book III (Chapters 3, 4 and 10–11). For the often-neglected distinction
between Aristotle’s treatment of metaphor in the Art of rhetoric as opposed to his Poetics, see
Mahon (1999).
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3. The research corpus consists of over 200 texts from British media in the period 1991–2001, which total
59,003 words, it includes more than 40 distinct body-related concepts as source domain input. For
details of the corpus see Musolff (forthcoming).
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